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Abstract
Using controlled experiments, we examine how individuals make choices when faced
with multiple options. Choice tasks are designed to mimic the selection of health insur-
ance, prescription drug, or retirement savings plans. In our experiment, available options
can be objectively ranked allowing us to examine optimal decision making. First, the
probability of a person selecting the optimal option declines as the number of options
increases, with the decline being more pronounced for older subjects. Second, heuristics
differ by age with older subjects relying more on suboptimal decision rules. In a heuristics
validation experiment, older subjects make worse decisions than younger subjects.
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“Having the opportunity to choose is no blessing
if we feel we do not have the wherewithal to choose wisely.”
— Barry Schwartz, The Paradox of Choice
1 Introduction
Under standard economic assumptions about behavior, a decision maker can never be worse
off when provided with more alternatives. This rests on the formalism that the supremum of
any function on some set X is never less than the supremum on some subset Y contained in
X. However, behavioral research suggests that individuals may have difficulty dealing with
many alternatives. Faced with a multitude of options, they often postpone making a decision
and are likely to be unhappy with their choices. Little is known about the quality of choices
in such settings. A number of important decisions in life such as selecting retirement savings
or medical insurance plans do involve a profusion of choice. This may lead to the selection
of seemingly suboptimal plans (Iyengar and Kamenica 2010, Choi et al. 2010, Kling et al.
2008).
Our objective is to understand how individuals make complex decisions and why they
sometimes make bad ones. We examine the frequency of optimal decision making in a simple
experiment where subjects face choice sets with varying numbers of multi-attribute options.
We are interested in how decision making varies with the nature of the choice task and with
subjects’ demographics. Furthermore, we investigate whether the use of heuristics or rules of
thumb changes with age. Given the recent introduction of the Medicare Part D drug coverage
program, we are particularly interested in examining differences in decision making between
younger and older subjects.
Many researchers have identified aversion to choice in a variety of settings. Iyengar and
Lepper (2000) show that consumers encountering a large assortment of jams or chocolates
are less likely to make a purchase or express satisfaction with their choice than consumers
presented with a smaller assortment. Redelmeier and Shafir (1995) and Roswarski and Murray
(2006) show that physicians offered a greater choice of drugs to prescribe are less likely
to prescribe any drug, while Iyengar et al. (2004) and Agnew and Szykman (2005) show
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that enrollment in workplace retirement savings plans decreases with the number of choices
provided.
The recent introduction of prescription drug coverage into Medicare provides another
example. As the new Medicare benefit was rolled out, reports in the popular press suggested
seniors were “overwhelmed” by the 40 or more options presented to them. In one survey,
very few seniors found this profusion of choice helpful, while 73% thought it would make plan
selection “difficult and confusing” (Kaiser Family Foundation 2006). Frank and Newhouse
(2007) argue that the complexity of Medicare Part D plans has discouraged enrollment and
likely resulted in suboptimal choices. In addition, Heiss et al. (2007) argue that most of
the 4.6 million Medicare recipients without prescription drug coverage would benefit from
enrolling.
Most previous research on decision making in these settings has focused on whether a
decision was made and one’s self-reported satisfaction with the decision. Our paper departs
from previous research by objectively measuring the optimality of subjects’ decisions and
by estimating the rules individuals use when making a choice. By examining how optimal
decision making varies with age, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to combine
an objective measure of choice accuracy with age effects. Several field experiments have
attempted to estimate optimal choices from actuarial or survey methods (Heiss et al. 2007
and Winter et al. 2006). However, these approaches tend to be limited by their inability to
define the full choice set or quantify the value of each alternative for specific consumers.
In a study similar to ours, Schram and Sonnemans (2008) explore the effect of complexity
on choice. They simulate the choice of stylized health-care plans with costly information
acquisition in which subjects are provided with their health profile which deteriorates over
the 35 periods of the experiment. They find that as the number of plans increases from 4 to
10, the quality of decisions decreases while the likelihood a subject switches to a new plan
increases. Schram and Sonnemans (2008) build on the work of Payne et al. (1993) who
examine a number of complex multi-attribute experiments in a variety of settings. They too
find performance decreases with complexity. Tanius et al. (2009) examine the effect of the
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size of the choice set on the quality of decision making. In their experiment, two groups
of subjects aged 18–64 and 65–91 faced a single task with either 6 or 24 options, where
each option represented a simplified Medicare Part D plan. They too find that the quality of
decision making decreases as the size of the choice set increases. However, in their experiment
the quality of an option is not an objective measure.
Our experiments provide subjects with a series of multi-attribute choice tasks where one
option is always objectively optimal. In particular, the ranking of options does not depend
on subjects’ risk preferences and requires only that subjects prefer more money to less. The
full choice set is clearly defined, as is the value of each option. While the optimal option is
always unique, its identity is concealed from subjects by manipulating both the number of
attributes of each option and the number of options. Unlike Payne et al. (1993), Schram and
Sonnemans (2008), and Tanius et al. (2009) our experiment is context-free and provides for
an objective ranking of options independent of subjects’ preferences. Moreover, in contrast
to Payne et al. (1993) we provide our subjects with financial incentives. Tanius et al. (2009)
provide a financial incentive unrelated to the performance in the task.
Unlike most experiments in economics, our subject pool includes individuals ranging in
age from 18 to over 80. While the effect of sex on decision making in economic experiments
has received considerable attention (Croson and Gneezy 2009, Eckel and Grossman 2008,
Cox and Deck 2006), the effect of age has been much less studied. One notable exception
is Kovalchik et al. (2005) who find little difference between older and younger subjects in a
variety of experiments. In contrast, we find significant differences and discuss this apparent
disparity later in the paper.
In our experiments, subjects make optimal choices in 40% of all choice tasks, with older
subjects making more decision errors than younger participants. Those who hold graduate
degrees make fewer errors, while other levels of education do not have a significant effect.
Optimal decision making does not vary with sex. We find that increasing the number of
options decreases the frequency of optimal choice. This effect is much larger for older subjects
indicating a second-order effect of age: older subjects experience a greater increase in errors
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than younger subjects as the number of options increases. Overall, we show that older
subjects make significantly less efficient decisions than younger subjects.
We examine several possible explanations for the age effect. We show that it cannot be
explained by different levels of educational attainment across age. A higher stakes experiment
replicates our initial findings, suggesting that economic explanations, such as search costs or
wealth effects, are not a likely cause of differences in optimal decision making across age.
We then focus on behavioral explanations by estimating simple decision rules or heuristics
subjects may be using.
Individuals often use suboptimal decision rules when selecting among 401(k) plans. Com-
mon strategies include allocating equally among all choices (Benartzi and Thaler 2002, Hu-
berman and Jiang 2006) or selecting the safest, low-yielding money-market funds (Iyengar
and Kamenica 2010). Given limits on the brain’s ability to retain and process information
(Miller 1956, Cowan 2001), the use of heuristics simplifies the decision. Heuristics employed
by younger and older people often differ. For instance, older individuals examine less infor-
mation and consider fewer options when making choices (Cole and Balasubramanian 1993,
Johnson 1993, Zwahr et al. 1999). Korniotis and Kumar (2010) use data on actual invest-
ment decisions of some 80,000 households and find that older investors are more likely to use
common investment rules of thumb and are less skillful at applying them successfully.
If older and younger individuals approach decisions differently, this could have important
policy implications. Can young adults be expected to make optimal retirement planning
choices when presented with a variety of 401(k) investment options? Can older individuals
be expected to make good choices when selecting medical or prescription drug insurance
plans? Both decisions have a significant economic impact, as total assets in 401(k) plans
exceed $1.8 trillion (EBRI 2005) and one of every twenty dollars in the United States is spent
on health care for those over 65 years of age (Liu et al. 2007).
The psychology literature identifies several common heuristics individuals use to choose
among multi-attribute options. Focusing on the most prominent ones, we fit a combined
model to our data and establish the weights subjects allocate to these different decision-
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making strategies. We find heuristics differ with age. Older subjects tend to discard infor-
mation on the relative importance of attributes, selecting options with the largest number of
attributes. This is akin to selecting a prescription drug plan based only on the number of
drugs each plan covers, and not the likelihood that each drug will be needed. We design a new
experiment as a validation of the heuristics estimates. We again find older individuals make
fewer optimal decisions as a consequence of their use of heuristics. We show that older sub-
jects are more easily manipulated through presentation and design of options, which results
in them not only making fewer optimal decisions, but also making less efficient decisions.
The cognitive powers of the human brain are not constant through life as cognitive function
and working memory decline with age.1 Perhaps as a result, older individuals appear to face
greater difficulties with decisions (Frank 2007, Hanoch and Rice 2006, Hibbard et al. 2001)
and are more prone to decision errors (Finucane et al. 2002). However, today’s seniors may
differ from today’s younger population for reasons unrelated to the cognitive effects of aging.
Generations may have distinctive traits that imply that today’s youth will not resemble their
grandparents in several decades. Differences in education, environment, culture, and economic
conditions may contribute to differences observed in a cross-sectional study. However, from
the standpoint of improving decision-making among today’s seniors, the distinction between
cognitive and cohort effects is less germane.
2 Experimental Design and Procedures
The experiment consists of a series of computerized choice tasks. In every task there are a
number of distinct states that could occur with a known probability. Subjects choose among
a set of options where an option is defined as a collection of states. Each task is represented in
a tabular form, a simple, common method for presenting alternatives that is often preferred
by subjects (Agnew and Szykman 2005). Figure 1 shows a screen shot of a sample task. The
set of states forms the rows of the table and is labeled “Cards” while options are represented
1See, for example, Mittenberg et al. (1989), MacPherson et al. (2002), and Zelinski and Burnight (1997).
With age, individuals experience lower recall (Gilchrist et al. 2008), reduced ability to make connections
(Mitchell et al. 2000), less task focus (Isella et al. 2008), and slower information processing (Cerella 1985).
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Figure 1: Screen shot of a sample choice task
by columns and labeled alphabetically. Checkmarks in the Options column indicate all the
states included in that option. Finally, the column labeled “Odds” shows the probability of
a particular state occurring, presented to subjects as the number of each card type in a deck
of 100 cards.
After a subject chooses an option, one state is selected at random. This is accomplished
by having subjects draw one card from 100 randomly shuffled cards displayed face down on
the screen. Once a subject draws a card by clicking on it, the number on every card is
revealed. If the subject’s chosen option contains the selected state, the subject earns $1 for
that task, and $0 otherwise.
In the example in Figure 1, a subject who selects Option A would earn $1 if one of the
twenty-four Card 1s, or one of the twenty-one Card 3s, or one of the twelve Card 5s, or one of
the nine Card 6s were drawn. Option C is the optimal choice as its expected payment of 0.71,
found by summing the probabilities of covered states, is greater than the expected payment
of any other option (0.66, 0.50, and 0.62 for Options A, B, and D). Drawing only one state
after the subject chooses an option removes considerations of risk from the problem, allowing
6
13 options
States Distribution 4 options
6 10 PDF 1 PDF 2 A B C D E F G H I J K L M
Card 1{ Card 1 21{15 2{ 1 X X X X X X X XCard 7 6 1 X X X X X X X X
Card 2{ Card 2 26{10 38{ 22 X X X X XCard 8 16 16 X X X X X
Card 3 Card 3 12 1 X X X X X X X X
Card 4{ Card 4 24{ 7 31{ 12 X X X X X X X X X XCard 9 17 19 X X X X X X X X X X
Card 5 Card 5 8 26 X X X X X X X
Card 6{ Card 6 9{ 4 2{ 1 X X X X X X X XCard 10 5 1 X X X X X X X X
The table shows the eight option, distribution, and state combinations. Subjects see options A, B, C, and
D, in 4-option tasks and options A through M in 13-option tasks. The likelihood of cards being drawn
is dictated by either probability distribution PDF1 or PDF2. The 10-state tasks are derived by splitting
some of the states in the 6-state tasks. The probability of the original state is allocated among the new
(sub)states derived from it, and each (sub)state inherits the checkmark (or absence of a checkmark).
Table 1: Experimental treatments
for straightforward comparisons across subjects.
Subjects are presented with eight choice tasks constituting a 2 × 2 × 2 within-subject
design. The first dimension is the number of options (four or thirteen), the second is the
probability distribution over states (PDF1 or PDF2), and the third is the number of states
(six or ten). The full design is shown in Table 1. The example in Figure 1 corresponds to the
4-option 6-state PDF1 task.
The number of options in a choice task was either four or thirteen, representing a more
than threefold increase across choice tasks. The distribution denoted PDF1 places more
equitable though not identical weights on states, whereas most of the probability mass of
PDF2 was concentrated on a few states. As a consequence, options under PDF1 have a
smaller variation in payoffs, while under PDF2 payoffs are more widely distributed. Decisions
under PDF2 may be easier for individuals who elect to focus on high-probability states and
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discount lower probability events (Camerer and Kunreuther 1989). The two distributions
differ as the choice set expands from four to thirteen options. Under PDF1, the optimal
option does not change as new (suboptimal) options are added. Under PDF2, expansion of
the choice set provides a clearly superior alternative as the optimal option changes from an
expected payoff of 0.71 to 0.96. More options are not helpful under PDF1, by design, while
PDF2 offers a significant chance for improvement.
The minimum number of states is set at six to ensure that thirteen sufficiently-varied
options could exist without including trivial options that covered either none or all of the
possible states. The 10-state choice sets are formed from 6-state ones by splitting some states
into multiple (sub)states. The probability of the new (sub)states totals that of the original
state. Any option containing the original state contains all new (sub)states while options
not containing the original state contain no new (sub)states. Thus, changing the number of
states does not change the underlying structure of the choice set.
The order in which subjects saw the eight tasks was randomized to control for order ef-
fects. Subjects learned the result of each task before proceeding to the next one. They were
not informed of the state and option expansion relationships. The order of options and states
within each choice task was randomized, but relabeled to maintain an alphabetical/numerical
ordering. Subjects completed the eight tasks after reading computerized directions (see ap-
pendix) and completing a 2-option 3-state task that served to familiarize subjects with the
interface.
A total of 127 subjects participated in the experiment. Subjects were recruited through
Vanderbilt University’s eLab, a demographically diverse online panel of over 80,000 individu-
als interested in participating in online studies. The panel is recruited via links from partner
sites, online advertisements, referrals from other panelists, and links from online search re-
sults, among other sources. Subjects for this study were randomly selected for invitations,
stratified by age and sex, with equal numbers of men and women targeted within each age
category. Given the large number of available panelists, eLab employs a two step procedure
for selecting subjects. First, about five to ten thousand panelists are randomly selected from
8
All 18–40 41–60 >60
Age (average) 50.7 29.8 50.2 67.4
Age (sd) 15.8 5.6 5.7 4.6
Male 54% 57% 62% 44%
High school 9% 6% 9% 13%
Some college 46% 51% 49% 38%
College degree 26% 31% 32% 16%
Postgraduate 19% 11% 11% 33%
Subjects 127 35 47 45
Table 2: Demographic characteristics of the subject pool
the entire pool subject to several conditions designed to maximize retention of panelists.
Second, a sufficient number of panelists from this sub-pool are selected based on expected
response rates for each person, obtained using a continuously updated response model. Se-
lected subjects are sent an invitation email and two follow up emails over the next two weeks.
For our study, the response rate exceeded 70%.
The average age of subjects was 50.7 with a standard deviation of 15.8. We grouped
subjects into three age categories used in the subsequent analysis: 18–40 years old (thirty-five
subjects), 41–60 years old (forty-seven subjects), and over the age of 60 (forty-five subjects).
Summary statistics for the entire sample and for each age group are reported in Table 2. Males
constitute 54% of our sample. In terms of educational attainment, 12 subjects had only a
high school degree, 58 had some college education but not a degree, 33 had a college degree,
and 24 were graduate degree holders. Every level of educational attainment is represented
in each of the three age groups. The experiment took an average of 21 minutes, of which 7
minutes was used on active decision making. Subjects received an average payment of $9.02,
including a $3 participation payment. Subjects were paid either by an online funds transfer
or a mailed check at the conclusion of the experiment.
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Optimal Nearly Optimal Observations
All 40% 65% 1016
Options 4 47% 72% 508
13 35% 58% 508
States 6 42% 65% 508
10 39% 65% 508
PDF 1 35% 73% 508
2 47% 57% 508
Age 18–40 52% 72% 280
41–60 40% 65% 376
>60 32% 59% 360
Sex Men 40% 65% 552
Women 41% 65% 464
Table 3: Frequency of optimal choice
3 Results
3.1 Optimal Decision Making
We begin our analysis with some general descriptive statistics of overall subject performance
(see Table 3). Since every subject makes eight decisions, there are a total of 1,016 observed
decisions. The optimal choice (with the highest expected payoff) was selected in 40% of all
tasks. We define an option as “nearly optimal” if its expected payoff is within 10% of the
optimal option’s payoff. Such options were selected in two thirds of all tasks.
Subjects made better choices more often in 4-option tasks than in 13-option tasks, select-
ing both optimal and nearly optimal options with significantly greater frequency (Wilcoxon
sign-rank p < 0.001).2 Subject performance for both measures is far better than would be
expected if they were making choices randomly, suggesting that the deterioration in perfor-
mance is not simply an artifact of the design. Increasing the number of states from six to ten
results in no significant differences.3 Comparing the two probability distributions, optimal
2For each subject, we compare the frequency of (nearly) optimal choice in the four 4-option tasks to the
frequency of (nearly) optimal choice in the four 13-option tasks.
3While the addition of four more states does not affect the frequency of optimal choice, it may have an
effect on the distribution of chosen options. For example, with 13-option tasks in particular, there appears to
be relatively more weight on the worst eleven options. Given the relatively small sample size it is difficult to
test properly for such distributional effects.
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choices were made in 47% of tasks with the extreme distribution (PDF2) compared to 35%
with the more uniform distribution (PDF1) (Wilcoxon sign-rank p < 0.001). The opposite
relationship holds for nearly optimal choices, though this can be attributed to the design of
tasks. In 13-option tasks, PDF2 offered one superior option with an expected payoff of 0.96.
No other option was close, meaning that optimal and nearly optimal coincide. PDF1 offered
multiple nearly optimal choices, making it easier to select one of them.
Overall, summary statistics suggest (perhaps not surprisingly) that subjects have a harder
time picking a needle out of a larger haystack than a smaller one. They also reveal a key
finding of this study—decision making deteriorates with age. An optimal choice was made
in 32% of all tasks faced by subjects over the age of 60 compared to 52% for those under 40
years of age. Similar patterns exist for nearly optimal decisions, with 60% of older subjects
and 72% of younger subjects making nearly optimal decisions. Differences in both measures
between the youngest and oldest groups are statistically significant (Mann Whitney p <
0.021). There are no significant differences between the middle and oldest groups (Mann
Whitney p > 0.225), while the young and the middle groups differ mildly only in optimal
decisions (Mann Whitney p = 0.071). There are no differences between men and women of
any age group under either measure.
We estimate a probit model to investigate how decision characteristics and subject demo-
graphics impact the selection of optimal options (see Table 4). The unit of observation is a
decision made by a subject. To control for the fact that each subject makes eight decisions,
we estimate robust standard errors clustered by subject. In the first specification, we exam-
ine the main effects of the design. We add demographic characteristics of subjects as well as
decision time in the subsequent three specifications.
In all specifications, we find that increasing the number of options from four to thirteen
decreases the likelihood of selecting the optimal option. Increasing the number of states from
six to ten has a negative, but generally insignificant effect. This is most likely due to the
relatively small increase in the number of states across treatments or the way in which the
increase in states was implemented. However, the estimated coefficient on the distribution
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
13 Option Dummy −0.333*** −0.350*** −0.192** −0.308***
(0.074) (0.076) (0.091) (0.099)
10 State Dummy −0.084 −0.088 −0.089 −0.147*
(0.071) (0.074) (0.074) (0.078)
PDF2 Dummy 0.312*** 0.324*** 0.329*** 0.376***
(0.064) (0.066) (0.066) (0.070)
Age (Years) −0.014*** −0.010* −0.010**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Male −0.133 −0.155 −0.071
(0.143) (0.141) (0.135)
Graduate Degree 0.576*** 0.621*** 0.577***
(0.167) (0.164) (0.156)
13 Option Dummy −0.479*** −0.502***
× Age > 60 Dummy (0.183) (0.191)
Decision Time 0.006***
(0.001)
Decision Time2/1000 −0.004***
(0.001)
Constant −0.199** 0.491* 0.244 0.077
(0.090) (0.277) (0.301) (0.287)
N 1016 1016 1016 1016
Log PseudoL −668.7 −645.7 −640.8 −623.6
Parameter estimates (std. error) with *, **, and *** denoting significance at 10%, 5%,
and 1%. Robust standard errors, clustered by subject.
Table 4: Probit estimates for likelihood of optimal choice
of states (PDF2 Dummy) indicates that a reduction in the number of likely states improves
performance. Subjects more often select the optimal option when facing a task with the
extreme probability distribution of states (PDF2) than when facing the distribution that
places more equal weights on each state. Recall that PDF2 has half of the states collectively
accounting for only a 5% chance of getting paid.
Age has a negative and highly significant impact on the likelihood that an individual will
select the optimal option. There is no significant difference between men and women in the
ability to select the optimal option, while a graduate degree has a positive and significant
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impact.4
Motivated by the effect of age, we examine the interaction between options and age by
adding a dummy variable for the oldest age group facing 13-option tasks. In specification (3),
the coefficient for this variable is negative and highly significant. This indicates a second-order
effect of age. Beyond generally worse performance across all choice tasks, older subjects are
disproportionately affected by the addition of more options. We explored other interactions
with the older age group. Adding a dummy variable for the older group facing 10-state tasks
results in a coefficient which is not significant with little change in other variables. If instead
we include a dummy variable for the oldest group facing the 13-option 10-state task, the
estimated coefficient is large, negative, and highly significant (−0.509, p = 0.005), with few
changes to other variables.
In the last specification, we add the amount of time, measured in seconds, that each
subject took to complete the task and time-squared to control for possible nonlinear effects
of time. The addition of decision time does not alter other coefficients, with the exception
of the number of states, which is now significant at the 10% level. Subjects who take more
time to complete a task tend to be more likely to select the optimal option. We cannot draw
causal inferences from this observation. It could be either that spending more time may lead
to better decisions or that better decision-makers may spend more time. In particular, having
an individual spend more time on a task will not necessarily result in a better decision. The
squared decision time term indicates there is a limit to the positive effect of time on optimal
decision making.5
4We only present results with a postgraduate education dummy as inclusion of ‘some college education’ and
‘college degree’ dummies produce similar results with neither being significant. A Wald test for the equality of
the two dummies indicates that they are jointly equal to zero (p = 0.258). A Wald test that all three education
dummies are jointly equal to zero indicates the null hypothesis of joint equality is rejected (p = 0.003).
5Several other methods of incorporating time into the analysis also do not change the qualitative results.
For example, our results do not change if we instead use instruction time or total experiment time, or omit
subjects who take the most and least amount of time or subjects who spend less than the median amount of
time.
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All
Age Sex
18–40 41–60 >60 Women Men
Efficiency 86% 90% 87% 84% 87% 87%
Normalized Efficiency 47% 60% 44% 36% 47% 49%
Observations 1,016 280 376 360 552 464
Table 5: Average efficiency by age
3.2 Decision Making Efficiency
Our results indicate that the frequency of optimal decisions decreases both with the number
of available options and with age. Next, we examine whether this translates to an overall
decrease in the quality of decisions. One must be cautious in making comparisons across tasks
for a given subject as the set of options differed, making errors more costly in some tasks
than others. For example, selecting an option at random would lead to a greater loss relative
to the optimal option under PDF2 than PDF1. Hence, our primary focus is on comparisons
across subjects, for which cardinal measures of performance are valid.
Table 5 presents two measures of average quality of decisions. Efficiency represents the
expected payoff of the chosen option divided by the expected payoff of the optimal option.
Normalized efficiency is defined similarly except that the average expected payoff of all avail-
able options is subtracted from both the numerator and denominator. Thus, normalized
efficiency represents improvement over selecting randomly, with 0% corresponding to random
selection, and 100% corresponding to optimal choice. We calculate (normalized) efficiency of
every decision and then average across all eight decisions each subject makes, arriving at a
sample of 127 observations. Similar to our results on the frequency of optimal choice, older
subjects make less efficient decisions. The mean efficiency of older subjects’ decisions is 84%
while that of younger subjects is 90%. This difference is highly statistically significant (Mann
Whitney p = 0.004). According to our normalized efficiency measure, younger subjects select
options much closer to the optimal one, with a 60% improvement over random choice. Older
subjects experience a 36% improvement over random choice. The difference between these
two groups is statistically significant (Mann Whitney p = 0.007). The difference between
14
Normalized
Efficiency Efficiency Optimality
Age −0.182*** −0.696*** −0.525***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Male -1.503 −5.762 −4.957
(0.019) (0.073) (0.051)
Graduate Degree 8.187*** 31.389*** 21.335***
(0.025) (0.095) (0.067)
Constant 94.688*** 79.633*** 65.630***
(0.034) (0.131) (0.093)
R2 0.118 0.116 0.116
Parameter estimates (std. error) with *** denoting significance at 1%. Male is
not significant at 10%. Dependent variable is the average of the measure across
all choice tasks for each subject. N = 127.
Table 6: OLS estimates of efficiency and demographics
the young and middle aged groups is only marginally significant for both measures (Mann
Whitney p ≈ 0.100), while the difference between the middle and older aged groups is not
significant.
In Table 6, we explore the role of demographic characteristics on decision making efficiency
using ordinary least squares. The dependent variable is the average efficiency or average
normalized efficiency across all eight decisions each subject makes, both measured on a scale
of 0 to 100. The unit of observation is a subject, with a total of 127 observations. For
comparison, we also present results with optimality as the dependent variable, where it is
defined as the percentage of tasks in which a subject selected the optimal option. Again, age
has a significant negative effect. Although the coefficient on the male dummy is negative,
suggesting men do worse than women, it is not significant. A graduate degree makes a large
difference increasing efficiency by about 8 percentage points and increasing improvement over
random choice by about 31 percentage points. The effect of the graduate degree is equivalent
to the estimated difference between a 20–year old and a 65–year old, holding all else equal.
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18–40 41–60 >60
High school 50% 31% 23%
Some college 48% 42% 35%
College 49% 28% 16%
Graduate degree 81% 70% 40%
Total 52% 40% 32%
Table 7: Frequency of optimal choice by age and education
4 Explaining the Age Effect
We examine several possible explanations for differences in behavior across age groups. The
first one posits that the age effect is explained by differences in educational attainment across
age groups. The other two explanations, one grounded in economic motives and another
involving differences in problem-solving approaches, require we run additional experiments.
4.1 Age and Education
According to the U.S. Census, older individuals have lower educational attainment in the
U.S. population.6 Given the large role a graduate degree has in our results, the age effect
could be explained by the educational attainment of each age group rather than age itself.
Due to subject pool composition and response rates, our experiment oversampled higher
educational attainment for older participants (see Table 2).7 A full third of oldest subjects
have a graduate degree. Thus, if educational attainment were to explain the age effect, our
results should be quite the opposite of what we find. In addition, we find similar age effects
within each education category, as well as a similar effect of educational attainment within
each age group (see Table 7). While graduate degree holders perform better across all age
groups, the younger graduate degree holders select the optimal option twice as often as older
graduate degree holders.
6See data available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/education/cps2008.html
7We did not stratify by education, but among the older population, individuals with higher levels of
educational attainment are represented more in the subject pool and had higher response rates than individuals
with lower educational attainment.
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Main Experiment High Stakes
All 18-40 61+ All 18-40 61+
Age (average) 51.0 29.8 67.4 47.5 30.0 65.6
Age (std) 19.4 5.6 4.6 18.6 5.4 4.2
Male 50.0% 57.1% 44.4% 47.6% 50.0% 45.2%
High school 10.0% 5.7% 13.3% 17.5% 15.6% 19.4%
Some college 43.8% 51.4% 37.8% 57.1% 50.0% 64.5%
College degree 22.5% 31.4% 15.6% 14.3% 21.9% 6.5%
Postgraduate 23.8% 11.4% 33.3% 11.1% 12.5% 9.7%
Subjects 80 35 45 63 32 31
Table 8: Demographic characteristics of the high stakes subject pool
4.2 High Stakes
It is possible older subjects are wealthier on average and are less sensitive to incentives pro-
vided in our experiment. To investigate the role of wealth effects and evaluate if performance
improves with remuneration, we conducted an additional experiment. We employed a frac-
tional factorial design, selecting four of the eight original tasks with stakes ten times those
used in the main experiment.8 Subjects were paid $10 per task if their selected option covered
the realized state. Subjects also received a $3 participation payment as in the original exper-
iment. Selecting from the same set of tasks as our main experiment keeps the difficulty of the
task constant while significantly increasing the cost of suboptimal decision making. Thus,
explanations rooted in wealth effects would predict an improvement in decision making.
Subjects were stratified by age and sex. A total of 63 new subjects were recruited,
with thirty two under the age of 40 and thirty one over the age of 60 with the intention
of contrasting the oldest with the youngest subjects. Table 8 compares the demographic
characteristics of the high stakes subject pool with that for the main experiment for which
we include only subjects in the youngest and oldest age groups. Note that the two subject
pools are very similar with the largest difference being the lower educational attainment of
the high stakes pool. Subjects took an average of 13 minutes for the entire experiment and
earned an average of $28.50. Though the total time for the experiment was shorter than in
the main experiment due to subjects facing four, instead of eight, tasks, higher stakes did
8The selected tasks were (listed as options, states, PDF): (4,6,1), (13,6,2), (13,10,1), and (4,10,2).
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encourage subjects to invest more time in each decision. Subjects took an average of 59
seconds for making each decision, measured from the time it was presented until a choice was
confirmed. This is 22% longer than in the main (lower stakes) experiment (Mann Whitney
p = 0.028).
Despite spending more time on each decision, subjects facing a larger reward do not make
better choices. Summary statistics for the high stakes experiment and the four corresponding
tasks in the main experiment are presented in Table 9. Increasing stakes has no impact on the
younger age group under any of the four performance measures (Mann Whitney p > 0.504
for each measure). For the older age group, performance actually declines with higher stakes,
though significance varies by measure (Mann Whitney p-values between 0.028 and 0.089).
Pooling together low stakes and high stakes data for identical tasks, we re-estimate the
likelihood of selecting the optimal option using probit. To capture differences between the
size of stakes, we introduce a dummy variable for high stakes tasks (see Table 10). Age and
graduate education again are highly significant. The magnitude of the age variable increases
markedly from the low stakes experiment, in line with our summary statistics showing even
greater differences in performance across age groups.9 The inclusion of time in the regression
does not affect estimates qualitatively, but more time spent on a task is associated with better
performance. In all three specifications, the coefficient on the high stakes dummy is negative
9It is possible that demographic differences in educational attainment across our samples and experiments
drive some of these results. To examine this, we also analyzed these differences within each educational
category. We find that our main results hold. In particular, performance in the high stakes experiment is
similar to performance in the main experiment for each age group and educational category. Also, within
each education category, older subjects have a significantly lower frequency of optimal choice than younger
subjects.
High Stakes Experiment
Main Experiment
(Corresponding Choice Tasks)
18–40 >60 18–40 >60
Optimality 57% 21% 56% 32%
Near Optimality 76% 44% 73% 59%
Relative Efficiency 90% 77% 90% 84%
Normalized Efficiency 62% 13% 61% 38%
Subjects 32 31 35 45
Table 9: High stakes experiment summary statistics
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but not significant (p > .232 for all three specifications).10 These results demonstrate that
performance does not improve in the high stakes experiment.
10We also replicated our analysis of Table 4 and Table 6 using only high stakes data. We found patterns of
significance identical to those in the main experiment. Additionally, since the high stakes experiment had four
tasks while the main experiment had eight, it is possible that the main experiment allowed for more learning.
We replicate the analysis in Table 10 using corresponding tasks from the main experiment only when they
occurred in the first four tasks finding no change in our results.
(1) (2) (3)
13 Option Dummy −0.289*** −0.069 −0.169
(0.105) (0.140) (0.146)
10 State Dummy −0.150 −0.164* −0.263**
(0.094) (0.097) (0.107)
PDF2 Dummy 0.396*** 0.406*** 0.440***
(0.095) (0.095) (0.100)
Age (Years) −0.023*** −0.018*** −0.018***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Male −0.226 −0.231 −0.202
(0.145) (0.145) (0.140)
Graduate Degree 0.529*** 0.540*** 0.523***
(0.174) (0.174) (0.171)
13 Option Dummy −0.449** −0.458**
× Age > 60 Dummy (0.216) (0.223)
High Stakes Dummy −0.116 −0.112 −0.170
(0.149) (0.150) (0.143)
Decision Time 0.005***
(0.001)
Decision Time2/1000 −0.003***
(0.001)
Constant 0.978*** 0.720** 0.604**
(0.259) (0.281) (0.275)
N 572 572
Log PseudoL −345.3 −343.1 −335.1
Parameter estimates (std. error) with *, **, and *** denoting significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1%. Robust standard errors, clustered by subject.
Table 10: Probit estimates for likelihood of optimal choice with high stakes
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4.3 Heuristics
Individuals may use simple rules for making decisions when faced with complex decisions.
Such heuristics reduce cognitive requirements by focusing the decision-maker on the most
promising strategies, albeit imperfectly. In this section, we estimate the degree to which
subjects use four common decision rules: payoff evaluation, tallying, lexicographic ordering,
and elimination of dominated options. We posit a utility function, u, which is a linear
weighting of the relevant option characteristics for the four heuristics considered:
ui,o = βXo + εi,o
where i and o denote an individual and a specific option, Xo is a vector of option char-
acteristics, β is the vector of weights placed on each characteristic, and ε is some random
component.
For each option, Xo is defined along four dimensions, all scaled between 0 and 1. First
is the option’s payoff, which controls for optimal decision making. It is the probability of
payment associated with each option. Second is the tallying heuristic which treats all states
as if they were of equal likelihood, discarding probability information (Dawes 1979). This
would favor options that cover the most states. It is measured as the percentage of states
covered by the option. Third is the lexicographic heuristic which favors options that cover the
most probable state (Keeney and Raiffa 1993, Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996). If this does
not lead to a unique choice, the second most probable state is used, and so on. This heuristic
performs quite well in a variety of decision environments (Payne et al. 1993). We measure
the lexicographic heuristic as the percentage of most likely states that are consecutively
covered by an option after ranking states by associated probabilities from largest to smallest.
Fourth is the undominated heuristic which focuses on eliminating the least desirable options
(Montgomery 1983, Hogarth and Karelaia 2005). In its simplest form, it selects only from
options that do not consist of a strict subset of the states included in another option. This
measure equals one if the set of states included in the option is not a subset of states included
in another option and zero otherwise.
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All 18–40 41–60 >60
Payoff 3.469*** 4.144*** 3.767*** 2.851***
(0.313) (0.691) (0.530) (0.481)
Tallying 4.843*** 3.325** 5.115*** 5.564***
(0.576) (1.116) (0.929) (0.988)
Lexicographic 1.869*** 2.661*** 1.612*** 1.455***
(0.273) (0.554) (0.436) (0.468)
Undominated 0.277 0.888** 0.238 −0.026
(0.188) (0.419) (0.312) (0.297)
Observations 1016 280 376 360
LogL −1729 −429 −639 −645
Parameter estimates (std. error) with **, *** denoting significance at 5% and 1%.
Unstarred parameters are not significant at 10%.
Table 11: Estimates of decision-making rules
For example, consider the choice set presented in Figure 1. Our four measures for Option
A are 0.66 for payoffs (summing over covered states), 0.67 for tallying (four of six states), 0
for lexicographic order (most probable state is not covered) and 1.0 for undominated. For
Option D, the four measures are 0.62 for payoffs, 0.50 for tallying, 0.33 for lexicographic order
(two most probable states), and 1.0 for undominated.
An individual is assumed to select the option that maximizes utility from options available
in a choice set C: ui,o ≥ ui,o′ , ∀o′ ∈ C. If ε is distributed (type 1) extreme value, the
probability of selecting option o ∈ C is given by
pC(o) =
eβXo∑
o′∈C e
βXo′
.
This yields McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit model. We estimate the maximum likelihood
parameters with standard errors adjusted for within-subject correlation (Wooldridge 2002).
Results are reported in Table 11 for the sample as a whole and by age group.11
There are a number of differences across age groups. Subjects aged 40 and younger give the
most weight to payoff maximization. They are also the only group that gives any significant
weight to an option being undominated. As age increases, the reliance on payoffs decreases
while the use of tallying increases. The youngest group places more emphasis on lexicographic
11As the logistic choice model cannot identify each parameter and the variance of the distribution, parameters
should be interpreted as β/σ, complicating intuitive comparisons across age groups.
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properties of an option than any other age group. For subjects over 60 years of age, the focus
is primarily on the number of covered states. This is an optimal heuristic only when states
are equally likely. For a person over 60, having an additional state covered in a 6-state task
is roughly equivalent to an extra 33% chance of getting paid (5.564× 1/6 ≈ 2.851× 1/3).12
Kovalchick et al. (2005) and Tanius et al. (2010) find no age effect in a variety of ex-
periments. Tanius et al. (2009) examine decision making in a similar setup to ours, though
there are significant differences between our experiments. Their experiment did not provide
financial incentives for the decision task, and does not allow examination of within-subject
variation. Further, their design does not allow for an objective ranking of options. In four ex-
periments, Kovalchik et al. (2005) found little difference in decision making between older and
younger subjects. They conclude that “a widely held notion, even among decision researchers,
that decision making faculties decline with aging” is unfounded (pg. 90). In contrast, we find
a significantly lower likelihood of selecting the optimal option as well as lower efficiency with
age. These seemingly conflicting findings may suggest that aging has a differential effect on
various types of decisions. Older individuals appear more often to use heuristic approaches
(Johnson 1990) and use different heuristics than younger subjects. For example, older indi-
viduals are more likely to overweight low probability events and underweight high probability
events (Peters et al. 2007), consistent with the tallying heuristic. Thus, it is quite possible
that age does not diminish our faculties, but does change the decision-making approach. The
set of experiments used by Kovalchik et al. (2005) differs substantively from our experiment
with almost no role for the type of heuristics investigated here. As a result, age differences
that we identify in the use of heuristics likely play no role in their experiments.
12As pointed out by a referee, this estimation nests the one player analogy of Quantal Response (McKelvey
and Palfrey 1995, Goeree et al. 2005) by adding the three heuristics—tallying, lexicographic, and undominated.
QRE would only use the expected payoff as the explanatory variable. The improved performance of the
heuristic model is in part demonstrated by the significance of the three heuristics parameters. Complete QRE
results are available on request.
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5 Validation of Estimated Heuristics
It is reasonable to ask how robust our heuristics estimates are and if they predict behavior
in a different set of tasks. To examine their validity, we conducted an additional experiment
with a new set of subjects and different choices tasks. A total of 66 new subjects (34 under
the age of forty and 32 over the age of sixty) participated in a validation experiment where
each task involved six options and ten states. As in the main and high stakes experiments,
subject invitations were stratified by age and sex. In terms of perceived difficulty, these
tasks are somewhere between the 4-option 6-state task and the 13-option 10-state task in our
main experiment. The experiment involved four distinct tasks, each of which appeared twice.
Subjects also saw the familiarization task as in the main experiment, for a total of nine tasks.
Subjects did not know tasks would be repeated and did not know that the order of tasks,
states, and options was randomized. As in the main experiment, subjects were paid $1 if the
selected option contained the randomly drawn state plus a $3 participation payment.
In addition to validating the estimated heuristics, our goal was to see if the employed
heuristics allow choices to be manipulated and whether older individuals will make worse de-
cisions and receive lower payoffs. Subjects were presented with substantially more variability
in option payoffs than in the original experiment along with more variability in the number
of states different options cover. In some cases, the best option had an expected payment of
almost twice that of the next best alternative. The four choice tasks are shown in Table 12
where options are presented in order of expected payoffs and states are presented in order of
probability. The table shows both the predicted probabilities for each age group based on
our estimated heuristics in Table 11, and the actual frequencies with which each option was
chosen.
In the first task, Option A covers only three states, but these states are the most probable
ones. Option B is the only option to cover more than three states. We aimed to exploit the
difference between a lexicographic heuristic and a tallying one, which simply counts the
checkmarks. Our heuristics estimates would predict that younger subjects would select the
optimal option with a 61% probability, while older subjects would select Option B with a
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60% probability. In the experiment, both groups selected the optimal option with greater
frequency than the heuristic model predicts. This is not wholly unexpected, given the large
difference in expected payoffs and the fact that the estimates are derived from an experiment
with different sizes of choice sets. Nevertheless, estimated heuristics predict the modal choice
for each age group. Further, younger subjects received a much higher average payoff, defined
as the sum of each option’s expected payoff times its frequency of selection. Average payoff
for younger subjects was 0.68 versus 0.53 for older subjects (Mann Whitney p < 0.001).
The second task is similar to the first, but adds more check marks to Options C through
F to increase the odds of those options being selected by subjects relying on the tallying
heuristic. Average payoff for younger subjects was 0.46 versus 0.39 for older subjects (Mann
Whitney p = 0.063). Across both age groups, more individuals select Option C through
F than in the first task, suggesting that the tallying heuristic can be exploited to some
extent. The third task attempted to induce indifference among all options for the older age
group. Options have substantially closer payoffs than in previous tasks and inferior options
cover more states. Looking at actual frequencies suggests the optimal was again chosen
more frequently than estimated, but significant errors among older subjects were observed.
Average payoff for younger subjects was 0.67 versus 0.62 for older subjects (Mann Whitney
p = 0.006).
The fourth task attempts to coax the younger group into selecting a suboptimal option
while leading older subjects to the optimal choice. A fairly extreme choice task needs to be
created for the predicted performance of older subjects to be greater than that of younger
subjects. Here, the tallying heuristic does well, as the option with most states covered is
optimal. The lexicographic heuristic, if applied literally, would prefer Option B. Ultimately,
younger subjects did not do worse than older subjects and in fact earned a higher average
payoff, 0.84 compared to 0.76 (Mann Whitney p = 0.005). This suggests younger subjects
adjust their strategy in the new experiment and are not easy to exploit.
Overall, the older age group chose significantly worse options, on average, in all four deci-
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State PDF
Options
A B C D E F
1 32 X X
2 30 X X
3 16 X X
4 7 X X
5 6 X X X
6 3 X
7 3 X X X
8 1 X X
9 1 X X
10 1 X X X
Expected
78 45 42 18 14 10
Payoff:
Predicted Selection Probability
Younger: .61 .26 .08 .02 .02 .01
Older: .26 .60 .07 .03 .03 .02
Actual Selection Frequency
Younger: .72 .24 .01 .01 .01 .00
Older: .34 .50 .05 .08 .00 .03
(a) Choice Task I
State PDF
Options
A B C D E F
1 19 X
2 19 X
3 18 X X
4 14 X
5 13 X X
6 9 X X X X
7 5 X X X
8 1 X X X X
9 1 X X X X X
10 1 X X X X X
Expected
56 30 25 26 25 17
Payoff:
Predicted Selection Probability
Younger: .50 .21 .13 .05 .09 .04
Older: .18 .30 .15 .15 .09 .12
Actual Selection Frequency
Younger: .69 .04 .07 .09 .06 .04
Older: .42 .34 .06 .05 .08 .05
(b) Choice Task II
State PDF
Options
A B C D E F
1 31 X X X
2 17 X X X X
3 12 X X X X X
4 10 X X X
5 9 X X X
6 8 X X X
7 6 X X X X
8 4 X X X X X
9 2 X X X X X
10 1 X X X
Expected
74 66 65 52 51 51
Payoff:
Predicted Selection Probability
Younger: .31 .18 .18 .11 .11 .11
Older: .16 .17 .16 .17 .17 .17
Actual Selection Frequency
Younger: .63 .06 .06 .07 .06 .12
Older: .31 .11 .11 .14 .16 .17
(c) Choice Task III
State PDF
Options
A B C D E F
1 13 X X X
2 12 X X X X
3 11 X X X X X X
4 11 X X
5 11 X X X X
6 10 X X
7 10 X X X X
8 9 X X X
9 9 X
10 4 X X X
Expected
87 77 46 38 41 38
Payoff:
Predicted Selection Probability
Younger: .35 .59 .03 .00 .01 .01
Older: .60 .35 .02 .01 .01 .01
Actual Selection Frequency
Younger: .88 .06 .03 .00 .01 .01
Older: .67 .11 .08 .03 .06 .05
(d) Choice Task IV
Predicted selection probabilities are derived from estimates in Table 11.
Table 12: Validation experiments
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sion tasks.13 The experiment suggests that the design of options can be used to manipulate
older subjects more easily than younger subjects. In particular, the tallying heuristic appears
to be more prone to manipulation.
6 Conclusion
Individuals frequently encounter complex environments in which they have to make a decision.
When selecting health insurance or retirement plans, individuals often have to consider and
compare many options, each with multiple attributes. Similar challenges arise in settings
ranging from selecting a cell phone plan to purchasing a car. Previous research has found
that when faced with a large number of options, individuals may be less likely to make a
choice or more likely to self report being dissatisfied with the choice they made. We use
laboratory experiments to assess if individuals are making optimal decisions when options
can be objectively evaluated.
We find that subjects are less likely to select optimal options from larger choice sets than
from smaller ones. Our results indicate that performance significantly decreases with age, but
does not vary with sex. Further, older subjects suffer a greater performance reduction due to
an increase in the number of options. This result was replicated with another set of subjects
for whom the monetary incentives for making an optimal choice were increased tenfold.
Differences in decision making across age appear to be caused by the use of different
heuristics. Older subjects simply tend to count the number of positive attributes provided
by each option. These tendencies were found to be robust when a different set of subjects
faced a distinct set of options in a validation experiment. Of course, context-specific heuris-
tics may complement our findings. If people learn about health insurance, specifically, over
their lifetimes, the inherited knowledge may benefit older subjects, offsetting some of the
decline in performance that we observe. We cannot conclude from our study the relative
contribution of cognitive aging effects versus cohort differences. However, by controlling for
13We also compared the observed and predicted choice frequencies separately for the first and second time
a subject saw each choice task. Qualitatively, there are no differences in results. Subjects are fairly consistent
on a given choice task. Additionally, as with the high stakes experiment, there is no indication that the results
are due to disparate education levels among age groups.
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one pertinent difference between the generations—namely educational attainment—we have
possibly removed one of the greatest differences between today’s younger and older cohorts.
Nevertheless, for policy aimed at improving decisions of today’s seniors, the distinction may
not be consequential.
One may be tempted to conclude that individuals are better off with fewer options, and
argue for artificially limiting choice as Frank and Newhouse (2007) do. Our findings should
not be interpreted as supporting this view. When the expanded choice set includes an option
vastly superior to any option available with fewer choices, average efficiency may increase
even if fewer individuals select the optimal option. Alternatively, a smaller share of a larger
pie can be better than a larger share of a smaller pie. While our results suggest that the share
will decrease as the number of options increases, the change in the size of the pie depends on
the specific options that are available in the two situations. In naturally occurring settings, it
may not be possible to determine if new options are better than those that previously existed.
Instead, our results serve as a reminder that one should be aware of behavioral biases while
promoting choice. The theory of asymmetric paternalism (Camerer et al. 2003), for example,
prescribes respecting consumer sovereignty by making all choices available, but presenting
them in a fashion that encourages optimal decisions among those using less desirable heuris-
tics. Subjects who rely on the tallying heuristic are likely to select the option that covers the
most states, independent of each state’s relative probability. Providing comparisons in which
the probabilities of states are more or less similar allows the tallying heuristic to perform well.
This could be a boon to those over 60 if, as our results suggest, they are relatively more likely
to use the tallying heuristic. Decision tools that refocus decision makers on the likelihood
of states might also combat the suboptimality of the tallying heuristic. Other decision tools
may actually encourage bad choices. For example, a common way of presenting Medicare
Part D plan options is by listing the total number of drugs covered by each plan. This may
encourage sub-optimal decision making by reinforcing a tendency to ignore the likelihood of
a state occurring.
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A Appendix: Experiment Instructions and Screenshots
Figure 1: Instructions
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Figure 2: Instructions (continued)
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